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THE  ENERGY  STRATEGY  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY 
Conference  of  US  and  European  Journalists 
s.  Carolina,  19-22  May  1982 
by  M.  CARPENTIE~,  Director  General 
of the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities 
Ladies  and  Gentlemen, 
This  conference  provides  an  ideal  opportunity  to  help  to dispel  misunderstandings 
that  may  exist  about  the  nature of  policies  in  energy  and  other  key  areas  on 
opposite  sides  of  the  Atlantic. 
I  am  delighted  therefore  to  outline  for·you  the  approach  of  the  European 
Community  on  energy  and  to  set  this  in  the  context  of  the particular energy 
problems  which  we  face  in  Europe. 
Those  of  you  on  the  American  side  will  forgive  me,  however,  if  I  trespass 
a  little on  your  territory  by  drawing  some  comparisons  with  the  concerns 
about  energy  and  the  approach  to  their  solution  as  they  appear  to  us  to be 
seen  on  this  side of  the  Atlantic. 
In  doing  so,  however,  my  aim  will  be  to  identify  the essential  elements 
of  common  interest  which  must  encourage  continuing  and  intensified cooperation 
between  us. 
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I  - THE  COMMUNITY  ENERGY  SITUATION  ·• 
During  the  past  two  years  there  has  be~n a  dramatic  fall  in  energy  and  oil 
demand  throughout  the  industrialised  world.  This  has  been  even  more  marked 
in  the  Community  than  in  the  OECD  as  a  whole.  Gross  primary  energy  demand 
in the  Community  fell  by  over  4%  in  1980  and  by  a  similar percentage  in  1981. 
Oil  demand  by  8%  in  1980  and  by  about  the  same  last  year. 
Thanks  to  growing  oil  output  from  the  North  Sea  and  the  fall  in  domestic 
demand,  our  net  imports  of oil  fell  to  a  little over  7  mbd  last  year.  This 
compares  with  12  mbd  in  1973  (before  the first "oil  shock")  and  over  9  mbd 
only  two  years  ago.  For  the first  time  since  1965,  moreover,  the  Community 
was  able  last  year  to  produce  at  home  over  50%  of  its own  primary  energy 
requirements. 
These  developments  give  grounds  for  some  satisfaction.  But  certainly there 
are  no  grounds  for  complacency.  I  say  this  for  a  number  of  reasons. 
Firstly,  none  of  us  can  explain satisfactorily why  energy  and  oil demand  have 
fallen  so  much  more  significantly  in  the  recent  past  than  anyone  dared  to 
predict.  We  in  the  Community  are  not  alone  in  our  uncertainty.  Observers 
throughout  the  OECD  area  have  found  it  impossible  for  the  moment  to decide 
how  much  of  the  fall  is  based  on  durable  economies  in  energy  use  and  durable 
changes  in  economic  and  industrial  structure on  the  one  hand;  and  how  much, 
on  the other  hand,  is due  quite  simply  to  the  recession. 3
Quite  clearly,  there  has  been  something  of  a  break,  over  the past  ten  years, 
in  the  link  between  economic  growth  and  the  growth  in  energy demand.  Between 
1973  and  1980  the  Community's  gross  domestic  product  (GDP)  grew  by  around 
174  while  energy  demand  remained  virtually static.  In  1980  the fall  in 
energy  and  oil  demand  occurred  while  GDP  grew  by  1.4X. 
But  no-one  can  be  sure  what  will  happen  when  growth  picks  up  again. 
Secondl~, despite  the  fall  in  our  dependence  on  imported oil, the  Community 
remains  exposed  to  developments  on  the  world  oil  markets  to  an  uncomfortable 
degree.  We  are  still the  largest  singleoilimporterintheworldC7mbd)followedby 
theUSA<Lessthan6mbd)  and  Japan  <Smbd);  our  supplies  of oil  come  predominantly 
from  the  Middle  East,  North  Africa  and  ~he Gulf,  with  some  45%  from  Saudi 
Arabia  alone  in  recent  months;  oil  imports  cost  us  around  t100 billion 
in  1981,  equivalent  to  4%  of  our  combined  GDP. 
Thirdly,  when  we  look  towards  the future,  we  must  be  struck  by  the practical 
limits  to  the  reduction  which  we  can  make  in our  dependence  on  the outside 
world  for  energy  supplies. 
Much  Community  coal,  which  is  largely deep-mined,  is  less  competitive  than 
imports,  many  of  which  are  strip-mined.  There  are  therefore  severe  financial 
and  practical  limits  to  the  expansion  of  the  Community  coal  industry.  The 
oil  resources  of  the  North  Sea  are  large,  but  even  on  the  most  optimistic 
assumptions  oil  from  the  British and  Danish  sectors  of  the  North  Sea  will 
supply  at  its peak  no  more  than  the  equivalent  of  25Y.  of  total  Community 
consumption.  The  Community's  production of  natural  gas moreover  has  probably 
already passed  its peak. 4
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As  a  Community  we  can  therefore  only  dream  of  energy  self~sufficiency. 
We  shall  succeed  in  reducing  our  dependence  on  imported oil.  But  however 
vigorous  the efforts  by  our  Member  States to  substitute domestic  supplies, 
our  overall  dependence  on  imported  energy  is  likely to  remain  significant 
for  the  foreseeable  future. 
II- COMMUNITY  ENERGY  STRATEGY 
That  is  the  background  to  Community  energy  strategy which  has  evolved  in 
response  first  to  the  "oil  shock"  of  1973-74  and  then  to  the  stimulus  of 
the  further  dramatic  surge  in oil prices  in  1979-80.  Its  two  overriding 
aims  are  steady  improvement  in  the  efficiency with  which  energy  is  used 
and  the  kind  of  energy  we  use  (what  we  now  call  "rational  use of energy") 
and  diversification of  supplies  both  in  terms  of  fuel  source  and,  where 
imports  are  concerned,  supplier  countries. 
These  twin  objectives  are  much  the  same  as  those  pursued  in  other  OECD 
countries. 
But  the priorities  for  action  which  they  embrace  may  be  somewhat  different 
in  their emphasis  from  those  of  our  partners,  reflecting  the  Community's 
particular energy  situation. 
The  European  Commission  has  drawn  attention to five  key  issues  which  will 
determine  the  success  of  our  transition  away  from  oil. 5
The  first  is to  ensure  an  adequate  level  of  investment  in ~omestic energy 
supplies,  in  the  conversion of  energy-using  equipment  from  oil  to other 
fuels  and  in  the  application of  more  energy-efficient  technology. 
The  rate of  energy  investment  will  be  perhaps  the  single most  important  factor 
determining  the  success  of  Community  energy  strategy over  the  coming  years. 
It will  also  have  a  vital  role  to  play  as  one  of  the  motors  of  economic 
expansion,  industrial  change  and  the  creation of  new  employment  opportunities. 
Yet  energy  investment  in  the  Community  has  been  stagnating.  In  1980  it was 
down  to  around  1.6%  of  GDP.  It  may  have  been  even  lower  last  year.  Member 
States  last  year  forecast  a  rise to  2.2%  over  the  decade.  Even  if this  is 
achieved  (and  that  is  an  open  question)  - we  would  be  way  below  the  figures 
forecast  for  the  USA  {over  4%)  and  Japan  (3-3.5%).  Making  plenty of 
allowance  for  different  national  circumstances,  the  gap  remains  striking. 
The  second  issue  is  the  need  to develop  and  apply  energy  pricing policies 
consistent  with  our  energy  policy objectives.  This  means  that  there  should 
be  no  price  subsidies,  that  internal  prices  should  reflect  world  market 
levels  and  that  they  should  taken  into  account  the  costs of  replacement  of 
existing  supplies. 
This  is  fundamental  if  we  are  to give  clear  and  consistent  signals  to 
consumers  and  investors. 6
It  is also  an  important  issue  in  respect  of  intra-Community  trade  where 
distortions  to  competition  can  arise if different  pricing principles  are 
applied  in  different  Member  States.  By  the  same  token  the  Community  has 
an  evident  interest  in  the  pricing  policies pursued  by  its major  trading 
partners.  Hence  our  welcome  for  US  oil price deregulations  and  our 
interest  in  the  acceleration of  deregulation of  natural  gas  prices. 
Thirdly,  we  must  concert  our  efforts  in  the  field of  energy  research  and 
development  and  in  support  for  projects  to  demonstrate  the  commercial  viability 
of  new  methods  and  technologies  of  energy  supply  and  use. 
Our  concern  about  the  pace  of  Community  R,D&D  in  the energy  sector  is 
naturally allied to  a  more  general  concern  about  Europe's  failure  in the 
past  to  innovate  as  rapidly  as  some  of  its trading partners.  We  have  to 
ensure  more  effectively  than  in  the  past  the  coordination of  our  efforts 
and  to  encourage  the pooling  of  resources- both  financial,  physical  and 
human  - so  as  to  make  up  for  the  natural  benefits  of  size  and  common 
language  enjoyed  most  noticeably  by  the  USA. 
The  fourth  area  for  Community  activity  is  in the  development  of  a  more 
coordinated  and  effective  role  in  our  external  energy  relations. 
Given  the  limits  to  the  development  of  our  own  resources  it  is only natural 
that  we  should  focus  particular  attention on  cooperation  in energy  and  the 
further  development  of  energy  relations  with  our  fellow  members  of  the  OECD; 7
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with  oil-producing  countries;  and  with  the  remainder  of  the  developing  world. 
Finally,  we  must  protect  ourselves  against  the  risk  of  renewed  tension on  the 
oil  markets.  In  present  circumstances  pressure  on  oil  supplies  and  oil 
prices  may  appear  to  be  remote.  Certainly  the picture  is far  more  rosy 
than  it  has  been  for  some  time.  But  we  have  witnessed  in  the  past  how 
quickly  the  oil  market  can  turn  from  a  buyers'  t?  a  sellers'  market.  And 
unpleasant  scenarios  for  the  future  are  all  too  easy  to  invent. 
Given  the  continuing  importance  of oil  and  of  imported oil  to  the  Community 
economy  despite  the  recent  reductions  in  consumption;  given  also  the  impact 
throughout  the  Community  economy  of  upward  pressure  on  oil prices,  the 
Community  must  continue  to turn  its attention to  minimising  the  risks 
and  mitigating  the effects of  oil  shortages,  should  they  occur.  In  particular 
we  must  seek  ways  of  avoiding  a  repetition of  the  events  of  1979-80  when  a 
very  limited shortfall  in  supplies  over  a  brief period  had  a  disproportionate 
effect  on  oil price  movements. 
This  is  why  we  have  spent  so  much  time  in  recent  months  discussing  appropriate 
procedures for handling  limited  shortfalls  in  supply  and  considering  in particular 
the  role for  oil  stocks  in  such  a  situation. 
And  as  we  in  Europe  turn  to  imports  of  other  fuels  we  must  also  be  increasingly 
concerned  about  the  questions  of  security  and  price  which  the  prospect  of 
growing  dependence  on  them  inevitably poses. 8
III - THE  POSITION  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 
The  United  States  is  in  a  more  enviable position. 
Just  as  in  Europe,  there  has  been  a  significant  fall  in oil  consumption 
and  in oil  imports  over  the  past  two  years  on  this  side of  the  Atlantic. 
Both  oil  consumption  and  net  oil  imports  are  now  below  their  1973  level. 
Net  oil  imports  continue  to  fall  as  a  percentage  of  gross  primary  energy 
demand  - down  to  15%  or  so  in  1981  compared  with  over  38%  in  the  Community. 
And  on  the  face  of  it  at  least  there  remains  major  scope  for  energy  saving. 
In  1980  per  capita  energy  consumption  in  the  United  States  was  2.3  times  that 
of  Europe;  and  the  ratio between  energy  use  and  gross  domestic  product was nearly 
1.7 times  above  the  European  figure.  Moreover  the  use  of oil  was  nearly 
70%  above  that  of  the  Community  despite  the  fact  that  the  US  population is 
some  SO  million  smaller  (220  million  as  against  270  million). 
In  addition  you  have  the  major  advantage  of  abundant  natural  energy  resources. 
In  1980  the  United  States  was  able  to  meet  over  85%  of  its primary  energy  needs 
from  its own  resources.  This  figure  could  be  even  higher  by  the  end  of-the 
*  decade.  And  in  its  annual  report  to  Congress  last  year  the  Energy  Information 
Administration  suggested that  the  United  States  could become totally self-
sufficient  by  2020  with~ imports  of  energy  from  outside  whatsoever.  That 
could  follow  increased  coal  production  and  consumption,  a  continuing 
(though  falling)  high  level  of  domestic  production of oil  and  gas  and  a 
substantial  increase  in  the  output  of  nuclear power. 
*  Nearly  90%  according  to  the  projections  in  this year's  lEA  Country  Review. 9
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Whether  self-sufficiency will  be  achieved  is of  course  impossible  to say. 
LThere  are  many  question-marks: 
- about  the  likely effects on  demand  and  on  supply  of  natural  gas 
when  prices  are  finally  deregulated; 
about  the  pace  of  oil  production  and  particularly the  economics 
of  "unconventional"  production  (enhanced  recovery,  tar  sands,  shale) 
in  the  light  of  developments  in  crude  oil pri c·es  and  the  rate of 
technological  advance; 
- about  the  success  of  the  present  Administration  in  reversing  past 
trends  in  the  nuclear  sector; 
- and  about  the  prospects  for  conservation,  renewables  and  commercialisation 
of  synthetic  fuelsQiventhe  reduction  in financial  support  by  the present 
Administration. 
I  do  not  intend  to  dwell  on  these points  which  will  no  doubt  be  taken 
up  in  our  further  discussions  today~/ 
But  the  fact  that  a  scenario  of  total  self-sufficiency  was  judged plausible 
on  the  basis  of  the  production  and  consumption  of  fuels  already  commercialised 
marks  a  major  difference  between  the  USA  and  Europe. 10
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The  European  Community  has  therefore  good  reasons  to  envy  the  United States 
for  its domestic  energy  potential. 
The  existence of  this potential  inevitably  colours  the  approach  to  energy 
policy priorities,  ~ccounting  in part  at  least  for  differences  of perception 
on  the  issues  of  external  dependence,  on  relations  with  the oil  producers 
and  so  on.  These  differences  are  heightened  by  historically different  approaches 
to  the  role  of  public  authorities  and  to  the  regulation of  the  energy  markets. 
Moreover,  differences  of  emphasis  on  other  questions  of  international policy 
(East-West  relations,  the  Middle  East)  may  spill  over  a  little into  the 
energy field. 
IV  - US  - COMMUNITY  RELATIONS  IN  THE  ENERGY  FIELD 
To  dwell  too  much  on  the  possible differences  in  perspective between  Europeans 
and  Americans  however  is  to  obscure  our  common  interests. 
The  first  common  interest  is  in  the  health  of  the  world  economy.  The 
United  States  is  less  affected  by  the  growth  of  world  trade  than  the 
European  Community.  But  it  cannot  divorce  itself  in  trade or  monetary  affairs 
from  what  happens  in  the  rest  of  the  world.  It  is  not  in  the political 
interests of  the  United  States  to  see  the  European  economy  exposed  to a 
continuing  risk  of  energy  constraints  on  growth. 
Secondly,  in  any  case,  the  United  States  economy  itself will  continue 
to  be  adversely  affected  it there  is  a  renewed  and  substantial  upward 
pressure on  oil prices  in  future  years.  The  more  it  can  reduce  its dependence 
on  imported oil  the greater  the  temptations  there  could  be  perhaps  to  return 
to  regJlated oil prices,  which  could  break  the  link  between  developments  on 11
the  world  market  and  developments  in  the  USA.  But  the  di~advantages of 
such  an  approach- its effectsonconsumption  and  on  production- have 
already  been  seen  quite vividly  in  previous  years.  Turning  the  clock  back 
would  not  be  an  ea~y option  to  defend.  In  present  circumstances  the interest 
of  the  USA  in  constraining  unpredictable  and  violent  swings  in oil prices 
must  be  very  close  to  that of  Europe. 
Thirdly,  the  United  States  shares  a  common  interest  with  Europe  in  helping 
to optimise  the development  of  the  world's  energy  balance,  through  the 
encouragement  of  indigenous  energy  resources  in  developing  countries and 
support  for  their programmes  of  conservation. 
It  is  true  of  course  that  there  may  be  different  views  about  the  best 
way  to do  this. 
The  present  US  Administration  underlines  the  role of  the private sector 
and  appears  sceptical  of  the  usefulness  of  too  much  involvement  by 
Government  and  by  international  institutions. 
It  would  be  foolish  to  pretend that  there  is  a  unanimity of  view  in 
Europe  itself  about  where  to  strike the  balance  between  the public  and  the 
private sectors.  But  there  is,  I  believe,  unanimity of  view  about  the 
importance  of  energy  development  in  the  developing  countries,  not  only  to 
improve  the overall picture of  world  energy  supply  and  demand  but  to  reduce 
the  risk that  growing  dependence  on  imported  energy,  especially oil, may 
bring  further  balance-of-payments  constraints  to growth  in the developing 
world. 12
Finally,  and  to bring  the  issues  much  closer  to  home,  Europe  and  the  United 
States  have  a  direct  common  interest  in  the  exploitation of  US  energy  resources. 
The  United  States  is  the  European  Community's  largest external  supplier of  coal. 
It will  almost  certainly  remain  so. 
The  United  States  could  be  in  a  position  to  export  to  the  rest  of  the 
world  some  85  mtoe  by  the  end  of  this  decade.  The  Community  will  be  a  major 
kt 
customer  as  we  come  ~ncreasingly to  depend  on  coal  from  outside. 
We  have  already  collaborated  closely on  this point,  both  at governmental 
level  and  at  the  level  of  the utilities and  companies  that  are  involved  in 
the  coal  trade.  Discussion  of  the  constraints on  expanding  the  coal  trade 
between  us  is  already  a  regular  feature  of  the official  consultations  between 
the  US  Administration  and  the  European  Commission.  There  are  obvious  problems 
and  uncertainties,  notably  about  the  transport  facilities  and  arrangements 
both  at  the  exporting  and  the  importing  ends.  We  must  find  ways  round  them 
and  I  am  confident  that  we  shall  do  so.  Already  the  pro$pects  look 
brighter than  two  years  ago  when  the  loading  arrangements  then  in  force  in 
the  East  Coast  ports  caused  a  hiccough  in  the  smooth  conduct  of the  coal 
trade. 
Close  ties  between  us  are  also  important  in  the  nuclear  field,  and  especially 
in  the  supply of  nuclear .materials.  We  must  ensure  that  there  is no  misunderstandir. 
between  us  about  supply  policies  and  attitudes  to non-proliferation. 
Looking  to  the  future  there  is  also  scope  for  much  greater  collaboration 
between  both  sides  of  the Atlantic,  and  between  us  and  other partners  in 13
the  OECD  in  the  development  of  more  advanced  technologies.·  I  have  already 
drawn  attention to  the  importance  which  we  in  Europe  attach  to  R,D&D  as  a  key 
facet  of  our  energy  strategy.  Our  pursuit  of  advanced  technology  need  not 
always  be  made  in  competition  with  our  partners  in  the  industrialised world. 
We  must  explore  the opportunities  for  better  collaboration  in  specific  areas 
such  as  nuclear  fusion,  coal  gasification  and  liquefaction,  transport  and  so  on-
without  prejudice of  course  to  commercial  confidentiality and  without  damage 
to  our  respective  industrial  strategies. 
CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
You  will  have  noted  that  this  presentation  has  turned  from  an  outline of 
Community  strategy  to  the  links  between  Europe  and  Amercia  in  the  energy 
field.  In  my  view  that  is  inevitable,  given  the nature  of our  common 
~nterests  in  the  energy  sector. 
These  far  outweigh  our  dift~rences.  Of  course,  that  may  not  always  seem 
the  case.  Our  differences  of  views  about  the  benefit  and  the  risks  of 
increased dependence  on  Soviet  gas  have  dominated  the  public debate  in 
the  recent  year  or  two.  And  they  have  been  compounded  by  differences  of 
judgement  about  the  way  to  approach  the  issue of  limited shortfalls  in oil 
supply  and  about  the  urgency  of  progress  on  this  issue. 
Sut  these  areas  of  difficulty  between  us  should  not  obscure  the  fundamental 
interest of  the  United  States  in  a  successful  energy  transition  in  Europe 
thro~gh  ~ncreased diversification;  nor  of  the  European  interest  in  the 
continuing progress  in  the  USA  in  constraining  t~e growth  in  energy  and  oil 14
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consumption  and  in  stimulating  new  energy  supplies. 
It  must  be  an  essential  element  of  European  energy  strategy to  continue  to 
encourage  cooperation  between  the  two  sides of  the Atlantic,  both  through 
multilateral  organisations  such  as  the  lEA,  in  further  Western  Economic 
Summits  (where  our  leaders  can  speak  frankly  to  one  another  about  how 
to  improve  our  collective  approach  to  energy  security)  and  also of  course 
bilaterally. 